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We modify the standard Kiyotaki-Wright model (1993) in order to add an autarkic option in
the agents' choice set. The value of the autarkic option is independent of strategic
coordination problems and represents a sort of reservation utility with respect to exchange
activity. This allows us to identify the conditions under which we can rule out the barter
equilibrium as an exchange coordination outcome. These conditions concern the value of the
inter-temporal rate of preference, the total amount of money and the rate of return of the
matching technology.
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One of the main features of the Kiyotaki and Wright [1993] search theoretic monetary
model (KW henceforth) is that the value of money crucially depends on the agents￿ability
to coordinate themselves on a monetary transaction technology. According to Iwai [1996],
the search approach implies a bootstrap theory of money.
Even if such a property formalizes the widely accepted idea that the use of money
depends on its general acceptability, it also produces an uncomfortable result. The mon-
etary equilibrium is always paired with a barter equilibrium which is qualitatively the
same: it is a strategic coordination outcome where nobody attaches value to money. The
bootstrap theory of money is always coupled with a bootstrap theory of barter and, para-
doxically, the search theory is able to explain why money exists as well as why money
does not exist1. In order to rule out the barter coordination failure, we should impose a
constraint on agents￿beliefs in money acceptability2, resorting to institutional and histor-
ical elements, that is on elements which are outside search theory and, more in general,
outside economic theory3. An interesting question is therefore the following one: is it
possible to identify a selection mechanism for the barter equilibrium which preserves the
bootstrap nature of money but, at the same time, does not call for exogenous elements?
This paper shows that such mechanism can be based on the existence of an autarkic
option in the agents￿choice set. Since the value of the autarkic choice is independent of
strategic coordination problems, agents are always able to compare it with the value of
all the other possible exchange-coordination outcomes (money or barter). If the barter
exchange system entails a pay-o⁄ lower than the autarkic option, the existence of the
autarkic option will destroy the barter equilibrium but not necessarily the monetary
equilibrium.
Unfortunately the original KW framework is incompatible with the existence of a non
trivial autarkic option. In order to allow for autarky, we must remove the assumption of
specialization in production and consumption4, but doing so eliminates any rationale for
money5.
An interesting and easily interpretable way to restore the consistency between money
and autarky is to model the endowment￿ s renewal not as an auto-production process, as
in KW, but as a complementary relationship between workers and entrepreneurs. In par-
ticular, we assume that entrepreneurs produce specialized goods by means of specialized
1This problem pertains also to the second generation search theoretic models, where the focus is on
monetary price (Trejos and Wright [1995] and Shi [1995]) and/or on monetary policy (Lagos and Wright
[2005]); to the extent to which, in these models, preferences are set so as to make barter transactions
unfeasible, the problem of the co-existence of barter and monetary equilibria is simply not considered.
For an extensive survey of recent developments of the search theoretic approach to monetary theory see
Shi [2006]
2This is not far from introducing a Clower constraint on individual transactions. However, one of the
main aim of the search theoretic approach is just to rise to the challenge advanced by Hellwig [1993]:
"....Why should cash-in-advance constraints be imposed?".
3This solution would be at odds with the Mengerian perspective, largely concurred by the search
theory scholars (see Kiyotaki and Wright [1991], Jones [1976], Iwai [1996] and Gravelle [1996]). In
Menger￿ s opinion [1892], the origin of money must have a purely theoretical explanation, independent of
historical and institutional elements.
4According to the KW notation, this is equivalent to set x = 1:
5A possible alternative is to assume the existence of an outside option which yelds a utility ￿U; with
￿ 2 (0;1) ￿ R+, where U is the utility given by a market commodity. However, this is obviously an ad
hoc solution and the selection mechanism would depend crucially on the arbitrary value ￿:
1labour services provided by workers, where the dynamic system￿ s viability depends on
the existence of a production surplus over entrepreneurs￿needs, which can be invested to
purchase the labour services necessary to start a new production process.
In this new framework there is an exchange coordination problem between workers
and entrepreneurs which calls for money, but there is also an autarkic option. As a
matter of fact, entrepreneurs can always give up the exchange activity and production
opportunities, immediately consuming the production surplus. The opportunity cost
of the autarkic option depends on the production and exchange di¢ culties and, as a
consequence, on the e¢ ciency of the exchange technology. If the entrepreneurs￿inter-
temporal rate of preference is su¢ ciently high, the monetary transaction technology turns
out to be essential to leading the economy out of autarky.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model
and analyzes its equilibrium property under the assumption that entrepreneurs decide to
invest their production surplus in a new production process. Section 3 makes the autarkic
option available and identi￿es the condition under which the barter equilibrium does not
exist. Conclusions follow in section 4.
2 The model
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents with unitary mass and in￿nite time
horizon; time is discrete. There are P entrepreneurs and 1￿P workers, where P 2 (0;1) ￿
R+. Entrepreneurs produce instantaneously two units of an indivisible consumption good
using as input a speci￿c labour unit and a consumption good unit necessary to restore
productive capacity. Workers produce instantaneously an indivisible labour unit using
as input a speci￿c unit of a consumption good necessary to restore working capacity.
Because workers and entrepreneurs need, respectively, speci￿c consumption goods and
labour units, an exchanges coordination problem can arise. Contrary to KW, this problem
is placed behind the production process.
The specialization structure is entirely described by a single parameter x 2 (0;1) ￿ R+
which identi￿es the probability that a generic entrepreneur meets a worker suitable for
his technology as well as the probability that a generic worker meets an entrepreneur who
produces a desired good.
Preferences over goods are homogeneous across agents and are described by a constant
utility U > 0. Entrepreneurs can directly consume the goods they produce or can store
them at no costs. On the other hand, workers can only consume a desired good and no
storage is possible. Labour units can be stored only by their original producers6.
Agents meet at random according to a Bernoulli process with parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) ￿
R+. As in Diamond [1982], and in departure from KW, we assume an increasing returns
matching technology, i.e. ￿ = ￿ (ns) with ￿
0 > 0, where ns is the measure of active agents,
who have a positive probability to carry out exchanges. This allows us to capture the
e⁄ects of positive thick market externalities.
Initially, a randomly selected fraction m of agents is endowed with an indivisible unit
of ￿at money (instead of goods or labour units). We denote with mP and m1￿P = m￿mP,
respectively, the measure of entrepreneurs and workers initially endowed with ￿at money.
Agents face the following strategic problems: (I) entrepreneurs and workers have to
decide whether to accept or to reject goods, labour units and money in all the possible
6This can be interpreted as a no-slavery condition.
2meetings, given the agents distribution among states and their trading strategies, (II)
entrepreneurs have to decide weather to invest the second unit of the production good,
or to consume the good and move towards a state of autarky.
2.1 Optimality conditions
Let us assume that entrepreneurs always decide to invest the second unit of the produc-
tion good. Hence, entrepreneurs and workers can be in the following states: state 0 =
entrepreneur with one unit of good, state 1 = worker with one labour unit, state 2 =
entrepreneur with one unit of money, state 3 = worker with one unit of money.
Let Vi, i = 0;1;2;3 be the steady state value function of a state i agent. Applying the
standard dynamic programming techniques we obtain the following optimality conditions:





nsxmax￿0 (V2 ￿ V0)] (1)





nsxmax￿1 (V3 ￿ V1)] (2)
rV2 = ￿ (ns) ￿
n1
nsx￿1 (V0 ￿ V2 + U) (3)
rV3 = ￿ (ns) ￿
n0
nsx￿0 (V1 ￿ V3 + U) (4)
where r > 0 is the inter-temporal preference rate, identical for entrepreneurs and workers,
ni, i = 0;1;2;3 is the measure of the active agents in state i, ￿i is the expected probability
that a type i agent will accept money and ￿i is the individual best reply.
Equations (1) ￿ (4) have the usual interpretation. For instance, according to (1) the
￿ ow return to an entrepreneur endowed with one unit of good is the sum of two terms:
the ￿rst term is the probability with which he meets a worker holding one unit of labour
[￿ (ns)
n1
ns ] times the probability that both want to trade [x2] times the gain from trade,
produce and go back to the previous state [U]; the second term is the probability that
he meets a worker holding money and willing to trade [￿ (ns)
n3
nsx ] times the gain from
accepting money with probability ￿0, where ￿0 is chosen optimally. The other conditions
have a similar interpretation.
Equations (1)￿(4) de￿ne a correspondence from (￿0;￿1) to the best replies (￿0;￿1).
The set of equilibria for the economy is the set of ￿xed points of this correspondence.
However optimal strategies depend on agents￿distribution and we have to prove that the
steady state distribution is uniquely determined by the couple (￿0;￿1):
2.2 Steady state
In steady state the in-￿ ow must equal the out-￿ ow state i, for i = 0;1;2;3. First of all
we observe that: out-￿ ow state 0 ￿ in-￿ ow state 2, out-￿ ow state 2 ￿ in-￿ ow state 0,
out-￿ ow state 1 ￿ in-￿ ow state 3 and out-￿ ow state 3 ￿ in-￿ ow state 1: As a consequence,





where the LHS is the out-￿ ow state 0 [in-￿ ow state 1] and the RHS is the in-￿ ow state 0
[out-￿ ow state 1].
To be consistent with respect to the exogenous distribution of agents between types
3and to the exogenous amount of money, the following constraints must be added:
n0 + n2 = P (6)
n1 + n3 = 1 ￿ P (7)
n3 + n2 = m (8)
ni ￿ 0 (9)
The following results hold true:
Proposition 1 For every m;P;x 2 (0;1) ￿ R+, mP 2 [0;minfP;mg] ￿ R+ and
￿0;￿1 > 0, the system (5)￿(9) has a unique solution in the variables ni, i = 0;1;2;3.
Proof. see the appendix.
Proposition 2 For every m;P;x 2 (0;1) ￿ R+, mP 2 [0;minfP;mg] ￿ R+, if ￿0 =
￿1 = 0, the system (5)￿(9) has a unique solution in the variables ni, i = 0;1;2;3.
Proof. see the appendix.
Proposition 1 and proposition 2 state that a unique steady state distribution is asso-
ciated with every meaningful couple (￿0;￿1)7:
2.3 Equilibria
A symmetric steady state Nash equilibrium for the economy is a collection of values [ni,
Vi; i = 0;1;2;3; ￿0;￿1] such that (5) ￿ (9) and (1) ￿ (4) are satis￿ed with ￿0 = ￿0 and
￿1 = ￿1.
Proposition 3 The above economy has three symmetric steady state Nash equilibria:
i) a pure strategies equilibrium, with ￿0 = ￿1 = 0 (barter equilibrium B); ii) a mixed
strategies equilibrium, with ￿0 = ￿1 = x (partial acceptability equilibrium MS); iii) a
pure strategies equilibrium, with ￿0 = ￿1 = 1 (pure monetary equilibrium M).
Proof. see the appendix.
Not surprisingly, the content of Proposition 3 is consistent with the KW results. The
main feature which distinguishes our model from KW is, indeed, the existence of an
autarkic option; but this last one is precluded here by assumption.
3 The autarkic option
If entrepreneurs are allowed to directly consume the second unit of good produced, we
have to take into account the strategic decision problem (II). As a matter of fact, en-
trepreneurs can now give up future production opportunities in favour of immediate
consumption. The permanence in state 0 yields the expected discounted utility V0 while
immediate consumption yields an expected utility U. As a consequence, entrepreneurs
will decide to consume their real endowments if and only if V0 ￿ U8. A sort of par-
ticipation constraint for the exchange equilibria sustainability must be imposed. Let us
de￿ne V J
0 ; J = B;MS;M as the value function of a state 0 entrepreneur in a type J
equilibrium.
7We have not considered the cases ￿0 > 0;￿1 = 0 and ￿0 = 0;￿1 > 0: However, these can never be
equilibrium strategies.
8We are ruling out mixed strategies.
4De￿nition 1 A type J equilibrium is sustainable if and only if U ￿ V J
0 < 0
We can now characterize the sustainability condition for all three possible equilibria.
In order to do that we have to: (i) substitute the equilibrium values ￿J
0 = ￿J
1; for
J = B;MS;M; in (1) ￿ (4) and (5) ￿ (9); (ii) solve for the steady state distribution nJ
i
for i = 0;1;2;3; J = B;MS;M; (iii) solve for the value function V J
0 for J = B;MS;M
and (iv) apply De￿nition 1 for J = B;MS;M. The (i)-(iv) steps procedure identi￿es a ￿J
threshold value for the inter-temporal preference rate r characterizing the sustainability
of a type J equilibrium.
Barter Equilibrium: a J = B equilibrium is sustainable i⁄:






2 = ￿B (10)
Mixed Strategies Equilibrium: a J = MS equilibrium is sustainable i⁄:
r < ￿ (1) ￿ (1 ￿ P)(1 ￿ m)x
2 = ￿MS (11)
Monetary Equilibrium: a J = M equilibrium is sustainable i⁄:
r < ￿ (1) ￿ (1 ￿ P)(1 ￿ m)x







Conditions (10) ￿ (12) have a quite intuitive interpretation: if entrepreneurs choose
autarky, their choice yields immediate positive utility U. As an alternative, they can
give up present consumption in favour of future consumption. The last option will be
preferred to autarky if only if the inter-temporal rate r is su¢ ciently low. Moreover,
because the value of future consumption depends on the exchange process, the threshold
level for r depends on the e¢ ciency of the prevailing exchange system. The value ￿j can
also be interpreted as the internal rate of return of the transaction technology j. The
investment in production implies an opportunity cost U, and future revenues with values
dependent on the transaction technology. The threshold ￿j is the rate of discount which
equates opportunity costs and revenues. A more e¢ cient transaction technology implies
a higher value of ￿, i.e. a higher internal rate of return9
3.1 Selection of equilibria
Entrepreneurs cannot maximize ￿J over J, but they can rule out the exchanges co-
ordination systems with an internal rate of return lying below r. In other words, if
￿M > ￿MS > ￿B , there are values of r such that the barter equilibrium, or even the
mixed strategies equilibrium, can be ruled out as exchange coordination outcomes. The
next analytical step is therefore to look for the conditions under which ￿M > ￿MS > ￿B.
From (12) we know that ￿M > ￿MS for every admissible parameters set. Let us
now focus on the relationship between ￿B and ￿MS. In order to accomplish this task
it is necessary to specify a functional form for the increasing matching technology. In
9In the KW framework we cannot de￿ne the internal rate of return of the transaction technology just
because of the absence of opportunity costs with respect to the exchange activity.
5particular, we assume ￿ (ns) = kn￿
s with ￿ ￿ 1 and 0 < k < 1 real numbers; ￿ =
1 describes a linear increasing returns matching technology, while ￿ > 1 identi￿es a
convex increasing returns matching technology. It should be noted, however, that with a
linear increasing matching technology, meeting probabilities are constant across equilibria
and thick market externalities do not produce any e⁄ect. This is because in a barter
equilibrium the number of active agents decreases, compensating for the negative thick
market externalities due to the increasing returns of the matching technology. In this
sense, a linear increasing returns matching technology is equivalent to a constant return
matching technology where all the agents are active, independently of their exchange
opportunities. More precisely, all the results obtained under the assumption of a linear
increasing matching technology could also be obtained with a constant return matching
technology (i.e. ￿ = 0) assuming that money traders are always active10.
Proposition 4 For every m;P;x 2 (0;1) ￿ R+; mP 2 [0;minfP;mg] ￿ R+ and ￿ ￿ 1;
a value m￿ (￿) ￿ 1 exists such that for m < m￿ (￿) it is ￿MS > ￿B, where @m￿ (￿)=@￿ > 0
for ￿ < 2 and m￿ (￿) = 1 for ￿ ￿ 2:
Proof. let us de￿ne ￿MS￿ ￿B = kx2[(1 ￿ m)(1 ￿ P) ￿ (1 ￿ m)
￿￿1 (1 ￿ P ￿ m1￿P)] =
g (￿;m). Note that g (￿;m) is a continuous function of m and, as the quantity of money
initially distributed to workers can not exceed the total amount of money, g is de￿ned on
m 2 [m1￿P;1): Moreover, g has the following properties:






b) if ￿ ￿ 2 then g (￿;m) > 0 for every m 2 [m1￿P;1)
c) g (￿;m1￿P) > 0 for every ￿ ￿ 1
Property (a) states that if 1 ￿ ￿ < 2, and provided that the total amount of money
is not too large, i.e. m < m￿ (￿); ￿MS > ￿B: Property (c), together with continuity of
g; make sure that m￿ (￿) > m1￿P: According to property (b), if ￿ ￿ 2, ￿MS > ￿B for
every admissible value of m: Eventually, it is a simple matter of algebra to verify that
@m￿ (￿)=￿ > 0:￿
Proposition 4 identi￿es su¢ cient conditions for an increasing monotonic ordering of
the internal rate of return ￿J from J = B to J = M. These conditions concern the total
amount of money and the rate of return of the matching technology. If we impose a linear
increasing returns matching technology, meeting probabilities are constant across equilib-
ria. This is because the thick market externalities e⁄ect is always exactly compensated by
the change in the number of active agents ns. At the same time, we have that an increase
in m reduces production opportunities in a monetary economy. Hence, in order to have
￿MS > ￿B; the total amount of money must be su¢ ciently low, i.e. m ￿ m￿: However,
as we move toward a convex return technology, i.e. ￿ increases, the monetary exchange
system appears to be more favourable, in terms of meeting probabilities, that the barter
system. As a consequence, the constraint on m becomes less binding. In particular, if
the thick market externalities e⁄ect is su¢ ciently large (￿ ￿ 2), the constraint on m
ceases to be binding and the monotonic ordering of ￿J turns out to be a general property.
10This is the same assumption introduced by KW where, in a barter equilibrium, money traders
actively search for trading partners even if money will be never accepted.
6Moreover, it is interesting to note that @￿M=@￿ = ￿@￿MS=@￿ = 0 and, if m < m￿ (￿),
@g=@￿ > 0 ; the larger the thick market externalities e⁄ect, the higher is the gap between
the internal rates of return of a monetary and of a barter transaction technologies.
We are now able to prove our main result:
Proposition 5 For every P;x 2 (0;1) ￿ R+ and mP 2 [0;minfP;mg] ￿ R+, if m <
m￿ (￿) a value r > 0 exist such that the pure monetary equilibrium is the only sustainable
exchange equilibrium.
Proof. it follows immediately from (12) and Proposition 4
If m < m￿ (￿); the monetary exchange system exhibits the highest internal rate of
return while the barter system has the lowest rate: the barter technology appears to be
more fragile and less e¢ cient than the monetary technology. As a consequence, a su¢ -
ciently high inter-temporal preference rate destroys the barter exchange equilibrium while
the monetary exchange equilibrium may still be feasible. In other words, if entrepreneurs
are too much impatient, they will never decide to invest their surplus in production and
exchange activity, unless a monetary transaction technology is available. Moreover, as ￿
increases, the gap between ￿M and ￿B also increases and the parameter set which allows
for the barter equilibrium selection enlarges.
4 Conclusions
We modify the standard KW model in order to add an autarkic option to the agents￿
choice set. The essential modi￿cation concerns the renewal process of endowments, which
is modelled as a complementary relationship between entrepreneurs and workers.
While the rationale and the nature of money appears to be the same as in KW, the
presence of an autarkic option makes operative a selection mechanism for the barter
equilibrium.
In the original KW framework there are no alternatives to exchange activity and the
only strategic decision concerns the exchange transaction technology. To the extent to
which agents may be unable to coordinate themselves on a monetary transaction technol-
ogy, the barter coordination failure always exists. In our framework the participation in
exchange activity itself becomes a strategic decision variable. Because of the decentral-
ized structure of transactions, exchange and production are time consuming activities.
To the extent to which agents discount future, they may prefer to stay in autarky, where
this last decision depends on the e¢ ciency of the prevailing transaction technology.
According to Proposition 4, money accelerates exchanges relative to barter and, pro-
vided that agents are su¢ ciently impatient, it may be essential to sustain an exchange
equilibrium (Proposition 5). If this happens, the barter coordination failure disappears,
and the only alternative to money is autarky, i.e. a no-exchanges equilibrium. With
partial reference to the classical Smith￿ s argument, money turn out to be the essential
instrument that allows the transition from an autarkic economy to a market economy, i.e.
to an economy characterized by increasing specialization in production and consumption.
From this point of view the modi￿ed model supports a bootstrap theory of monetary
exchanges but not a bootstrap theory of barter exchanges.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The system (5) ￿ (8) can be reduced to ’(n3) = ￿1=￿0 2
(0;+1); where ’ is a monotonically strictly increasing continuous function. Moreover,
because of the non-negativity constraints (9); ’ is de￿ned on (a;b) ￿ R+; where a =
a(m;P) and b = b(m;P). It is easy to show that 8 m;P 2 (0;1) ￿ R+, limn3!a ’(n3) =
0 and limn3!b ’(n3) = +1: By continuity of ’ it follows that 9! n￿
3 2 (a;b) such that
’(n￿
3) = ￿1=￿0. The steady state solution for ni, i = 0;1;2: can be obtained from
(6) ￿ (8) with n3 = n￿
3:￿
Proof of Proposition 2: If ￿1 = ￿0 = 0, agents endowed with money have no
exchange opportunity. It follows that n2 = n3 = 0 and ns = 1 ￿ m. Only entrepreneurs
initially endowed with one unit of good and workers initially endowed with a labour unit
will be active, so that n0 = P ￿ mP and n1 = 1 ￿ P ￿ m1￿P.￿
8Proof of Proposition 3: The optimal choices ￿1 and ￿0 depend on sign(V2 ￿V0) and
sign(V3 ￿ V1). From (1) ￿ (4), we have:
V2 ￿ V0 =
￿ (ns) ￿ [n1=ns]xU [￿1 ￿ x]
r + ￿ (ns) ￿ f[n1=ns]x￿1 + [n3=ns]xmax￿0g
(13)
V3 ￿ V1 =
￿ (ns) ￿ [n0=ns]xU [￿0 ￿ x]
r + ￿ (ns) ￿ f[n0=ns]x￿0 + [n2=ns]xmax￿1g
(14)
Equation (13) represents the gain of an entrepreneur moving from state 0 to state 2 as
a function of workers￿strategy. Similarly, equation (14) represents the gain of a worker
moving from state 1 to state 3 as a function of entrepreneurs￿strategy.
From (13) we observe that if ￿1 > x, i.e. if workers￿probability of accepting money
is higher than workers￿probability of accepting goods, V2￿V0 > 0. This implies, accord-
ing to (1), that max￿0 = 1; entrepreneurs always take advantage of accepting money.
Because of symmetry ￿0 = 1; but if ￿0 = 1 > x, from (14) we have V3 ￿ V1 > 0 and
max￿1 = 1, i.e. ￿1 = 1. Therefore ￿0 = ￿1 = 1 is a pure strategies equilibrium:
Following the same procedure, the existence of the other two equilibria can be proven.￿
9